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CORRESPONDENCE
A TOUR OF MISTAKES
Paul H. Edelman*
In these pages,1 Steven Lubet recently reviewed A Tour of the Calcu-
lus, by David Berlinski.2 Inspired by both the beauty of calculus and Ber-
linski's description of it, Lubet waxes poetic on the many parallels between
the law and calculus. It is completely understandable--even admirable-
that one might be led to ruminations on the relationship between calculus
and one's own discipline. There is little doubt that the subject of calculus
stands as one of the great intellectual feats of Western thought. It has had
profound implications for physics, engineering, economics and many other
disciplines-so why not law? Alas, these philosophical musings would be
more persuasive had Professor Lubet better understood what it was that he
was writing about.
Lubet's errors come in two types. The first is just a misunderstanding
of history, but it is a misunderstanding that unfortunately forms the basis for
an entire section of his review. The second type of error is more funda-
mentally mathematical: he does not distinguish between a definition and a
theorem. Just as Lubet draws legal lessons from calculus, we can draw le-
gal parallels from his mistakes. While some of these might be comforting,
others will be more unsettling.
As noted by Lubet, the development of calculus was done more or less
simultaneously in the mid-17th century by Sir Isaac Newton and Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz based much of his development of the subject on
the idea of an infinitesimal, a class of numbers that are smaller than any
other number. According to Lubet, "the 'infinitesimals' turn out to be a fu-
tile fiction, notwithstanding Liebnitz's [sic] own endorsement of them. In
1734, Bishop Berkeley proved conclusively that they do not and cannot ex-
ist."3 Lubet goes on in Part II to draw a number of legal parallels to this
discrediting of the idea of infinitesimals. While- the legal conclusions he
draws from these events may well be true, Lubet cannot base them on the
invalidity of infinitesimals: the fact of the matter is that Leibniz was right.
* Professor of Mathematics, University of Minnesota, <edelman@math.umn.edu>. I would like to
thank Steven Lubet and Suzanna Sherry for their helpful comments.
1 See Steven Lubet, A Tour of the Calculus of Justice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1035 (1998).
2 DAVID BERLINSKI, A TOUR OF THE CALCULUS (1995).
3 Lubet, supra note 1, at 1037 (footnote omitted).
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To be fair to Lubet, the ultimate vindication of Leibniz's belief in in-
finitesimals is hidden in a footnote by Berlinski: "The development of
[non-Archimedean] fields by the logician Abraham Robinson in the twenti-
eth century has made possible the development of the calculus entirely
along the lines anticipated by Leibnitz [sic]."4 Nevertheless, anyone with
serious mathematical training would not have needed Berlinski's footnote;
Lubet's error highlights the danger of relying on secondhand knowledge of
a field quite different from one's own. Moreover, culpability aside, Lubet
has lost the foundation for the legal insights he draws from the purported
invalidity of infinitesimals.
And what of the supposed "proof' of Bishop Berkeley? Berlinski
writes that "[w]riting in 1734, Bishop Berkeley wasted no time in attacking
the very idea of infinitesimals," and later says that "[1]ooking backward, we
can see that Berkeley was entirely correct,"5 but never claims that Bishop
Berkeley "proved conclusively" anything about the existence of infinitesi-
mals. Indeed, he couldn't have, since by appropriately generalizing the idea
of a number, Abraham Robinson was able to define them. Lubet should be
more careful in using the term "proof' in the context of mathematics.
Lubet sees more parallels between the computation of the area under a
curve and the way that legal trials "proceed by means of accretion of de-
tail."6 Surprisingly, Lubet doesn't draw the obvious parallel, that just as the
sum of more and more rectangles gives better and better approximations for
the area under a curve, as a trial proceeds the evidence presented gives a
better and better approximation of the truth. He instead focuses on the error
in the mathematical approximation:
An integral combines rectangles until the limit of the error approaches zero,
but the error-zone never actually becomes zero .... There is always a gap. In
fact, there is always a boundless gap, because two numbers, no matter how
close, are always separated by an infinite interval.
Between the knowledge that we gain at trial, and real events as they oc-
curred in the world, there is also always an infinite gap. We can never, not
ever, know all of the rich textured, complex, measureless, particulars that
comprise actual experience.
There is one obvious thing wrong with Lubet's description of the inte-
gral. It is simply not true that "there is always a boundless gap, because
4 BERLINSKI, supra note 2, at 117 n.2. As Lubet observes in his reply, Berlinski asserts that a de-
velopment of calculus using infinitesimals is less plausible than one using limits. See Steven Lubet, Lu-
bet Replies to Edelman: Mistakes? What Mistakes?, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 347, 348 (1998). This only
means that such a derivation is less intuitive and somewhat harder to understand, not that it is incorrect.
There is no "dissension" among mathematicians as to the rigor of such a development. Id.
5 BERLINSKI, supra note 2, at 114.
6 Lubet, supra note 1, at 1043.
7 Id. at 1043-44.
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two numbers, no matter how close, are always separated by an infinite in-
terval." Just because there are an infinite number of numbers between any
two other numbers does not make the gap between them boundless. Such
an assertion is equivalent to saying the distance between Evanston and Chi-
cago is the same as the distance between Minneapolis and Chicago.
More important than this mistake is Lubet's fundamental confusion
about what it means to compute the area under a curve. "Area" is a mathe-
matically sophisticated notion. Except for rectangles, it is difficult to be
precise about what exactly area is. In fact, mathematicians define the area
under the curve to be the limit of certain sums. That is, calculus defines
precisely what the "area" under a curve is and then offers a theorem that
allows one to compute its value.8 Berlinski is careful to make this point,9
although Lubet apparently overlooks it.
What lesson from law should we draw from this more accurate de-
scription of what integral calculus does? The closest parallel of the sort that
Lubet makes would be to claim that the outcome of the trial is not an ap-
proximation of the truth but is, in fact, the definition of the truth. Maybe
lawyers should not learn too much from calculus.
Many disciplines, other than the traditional scientific ones, have at-
tempted to use mathematics to give a firm foundation for their research. In
some cases utilizing mathematics has led to some real insight. In other
cases it has produced, at best, a veneer of respectability.
Given the growth of "law and" disciplines, it would not be surprising
if mathematics were to creep into legal academia. Perhaps this commentary
will sound a cautionary note before Law and Mathematics joins these other
mongrels. Unlike the writing of French philosophers, the theorems of
mathematics are not subject to wide interpretation. They mean something.
Aid they should be understood before they are invoked.
8 Thus, contrary to Lubet's continued insistence, there is no gap between the actual area under a
curve and what calculus computes. See Lubet, supra note 4, at 347.
9 See BERLINSKI, supra note 2, at 256.
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